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THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT OF 1977
AND PROSECUTORIAL APPEAL OF SENTENCES:
JUSTICE OR DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
PAUL W.

SPENCE*

INTRODUCTION

The double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment provides
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb." Although primarily intended to protect
individuals against the threat of a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal or conviction, the prohibition against double
jeopardy also shields the accused "from attempts to secure
additional punishment after a prior conviction and sentence."' This
constitutional principle is seriously undermined by the proposed
Criminal Code Reform Act of 19772 which, amidst a thorough
revamping of the federal sentencing system, provides for increases
in sentences as a result of appellate review initiated by the
government. While the constitutional validity of such a procedure
has never been addressed by the Supreme Court, the probable
resolution of the conflict between the double jeopardy clause and the
proposed procedure may be foreshadowed by the Court's application
of traditional double jeopardy principles to the sentencing context.
The conclusion of this article is that respect for the policies of
finality and protection against governmental harassment which
underlie the double jeopardy clause compels the determination that
the provision in S. 1437 for prosecutorial appeal of sentences is
unconstitutional.
THE STATUTE

The proposed Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 is an ambitious
attempt "to reorganize and streamline the administration of Federal
criminal justice."' 3 Perceiving the present statutory scheme of federal
* B.A. 1975, Johns Hopkins University; J.D. 1978, University of Maryland
School of Law. Member of the Maryland Bar.
1. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). See Ex parteLange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163, 173 (1874).
2. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 1437]. As of the end
of the second session of the 95th Congress, S. 1437 had been passed by the Senate, 124
CONG. REC. S860 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978), and the companion bill, H.R. 6869, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H3979 (daily ed. May 3, 1977) (reintroduced after

markup by the Subcommittee on Criminal Procedure as H.R. 13,959, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H8970 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1978)), was referred to the House

Judiciary Committee but was never considered by the full House.
3. 123 CONG. REc. S6838 (daily ed. May 2, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
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criminal statutes as "a hodgepodge of conflicting, contradictory, and
imprecise laws," 4 the drafters of S. 1437 set out to create a
comprehensive system with a consistency and rationality lacking in
the federal criminal law. 5 In addition to addressing such issues as
federal jurisdiction, substantive law, and criminal behavior, the
drafters sought to establish a practical and coherent framework for
sentencing, replacing "existing anomalies with a rational system for
distinguishing the degree of criminal behavior while yet insuring
6
uniformity."
One of the most notable innovations of the proposed Act
concerns sentencing reform. It prescribes the use of sentencing
guidelines promulgated by a newly created United States Sentencing
Commission. 7 These guidelines would provide direction for the trial
court in determining whether a term of imprisonment, a sentence of
probation, or a fine should be imposed;8 what the appropriate
amount of a fine or length of imprisonment or probation would be; 9
and whether a portion of a prison term should be designated as
subject to a defendant's early release and, if so, the length of that
portion. 10 Regarding the form of punishment and, if applicable, what
prison term should be imposed upon a convicted defendant, it is the
court's duty under the proposed legislation to consider these
guidelines which include "the sentencing range established for the
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category
of defendant as set forth in the guidelines that are issued by the
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1) and that are
in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced."" The judge is also
required to state in open court the reasons for imposing a particular
sentence.12 It is important to note that the Sentencing Commission's
guidelines would be recommendations and not requirements. The
sentencing court may, within the lawful limits set by proposed 18
U.S.C. § 2301,13 deviate from the sentencing range and impose a

4. S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).

5. See id. at 4-7.
6. Id. at 9.
7. S. 1437, supra note 2, § 124 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 994).

8. Id. (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(A)).
9. Id. (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(B)).
10. Id. (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(C)). Parole (early release) would be
abolished except in those rare instances in which the court finds no other way to
provide a needed program.
11. Id. § 101 (to be codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2003(a)(4)).
12. Id. (to be codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2003(b)).
13. Section 2301 delineates authorized terms of imprisonment for specific classes
of felonies and misdemeanors. In effect, this section establishes the maximum lawful
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longer or shorter term of imprisonment than that provided for in the
Commission's guidelines. 14 The consequences of this are twofold.
Not only must the court state in open court the specific reason for
imposing a sentence outside the recommended range,' 5 but more
importantly, its action is subject to appellate review.
Proposed 18 U.S.C. §3725 of the Act provides for limited
appellate review of sentences. This provision deals only with
sentences imposed for felonies and excludes those based upon plea
bargaining as well as sentences within the applicable range
recommended by the Commission. Such review may be sought either
by the defendant, if the final sentence imposed is higher than the
maximum established by the guidelines, or by the government, if the
sentence is lower than the minimum prescribed. Section 3725(b),
entitled "Appeal by the Government," states in pertinent part:
The government may, with the approval of the Attorney General
or his designee, file a notice of appeal in the district court for
review of a final sentence imposed for a felony if the sentence
includes a lesser fine or term of .imprisonment than the
minimum established in the guidelines, or a greater portion of a
term of imprisonment subject to the defendant's early release
than the maximum established in the guidelines that are issued
by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1),
and that are found by the sentencing court to be applicable to
16
the case ....
The government initiates the sentence review process by filing a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court who then certifies
designated portions of the record, the presentence report, and
information submitted during the sentencing proceedings, to the
court of appeals. 1 7 Section 3725(d) directs the court of appeals to
consider both the factors appropriate to the imposition of sentence
under section 2003 and the reasons for the sentence stated by the
trial court. If the appellate court concludes that the sentence imposed
was not unreasonable, it must affirm. 18 If the appellate court finds
that the sentence was unreasonable, however, it is authorized to
impose a greater sentence, to remand for imposition of a greater
term of imprisonment that a sentencing court may impose for a particular category of
offense.
14. S. 1437, supra note 2, § 101 (to be codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2003(b)).

15. Id.
16. Id. (to be codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3725(b)).
17. Id. (to be codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3725(c)).
18. Id. (to be codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3725(eX2)).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 37

sentence, or to remand for further sentencing proceedings. 19 In
effect, section 3725(b) authorizes the prosecutor to seek an increase of
the trial court's sentence on appeal. This provision raises a serious
constitutional issue in light of the double jeopardy clause and invites
an assessment of its validity. 20
TWICE IN JEOPARDY:

A BACKGROUND

Although the double jeopardy prohibition originated during
ancient Greek and Roman times, 21 its contemporary meaning
remains unsettled. At common law, the doctrine was relatively
narrow and dependent upon the highly technical formalities of
criminal proceedings. 22 Its incorporation into the Bill of Rights,
however, firmly established this prohibition as a basic right of
American citizens and a fundamental tenet of American jurispru-

19. Id. (to be codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3725(e)(1)(B)).
20. During the course of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures hearings on S. 1437, in general, and governmental appeal of sentences, in
particular, the following exchange took place:
Senator HATCH. Do you anticipate any difficulties with double jeopardy
problems concerning government appeal of sentences?
Judge WEBSTER. In terms of H.R. 7245, we were sufficiently concerned
about our ability to handle that by the rulemaking process, but we asked that
the Congress consider dealing with it.
As far as double jeopardy is concerned, I do not think that is a problem.
There is ample case authority for enhancement of sentences.
Senator HATCH. Do you both agree on that?

Judge TJOFLAT. Yes.

Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearingon S. 1437 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8954 (1977). Judges Webster (currently director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation) and Tjoflat were the official spokesmen for the Judicial Conference of
the United States at the Senate hearings. In contrast, Roger A. Lowenstein, Federal
Public Defender for the District of New Jersey on behalf of the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association, concluded in a prepared statement presented before the
subcommittee, "[C]onsiderations of both a constitutional and public policy nature
require that the government not be permitted to appeal sentences which are below the
suggested guidelines." Id. at 9148.
21. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-52 & n.3 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
22. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335-36; J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY
16-21 (1969). For example, this "universal maxim of the common law" did not
preclude subsequent proceedings if the verdict or acquittal was rendered upon a faulty
indictment, by a court technically lacking jurisdiction, or where no judgment had
been reached due to a premature termination. Furthermore, the plea of former
jeopardy was no bar to multiple prosecutions for noncapital felonies or misdemeanors.
Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 452-53 (1977).
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dence,23 but because the limits of the double jeopardy clause were left
undefined, the courts became the arbiters of its meaning.
Speaking for the Court in Green v. United States, 24 Mr. Justice
Black cogently expressed the policies underlying the double jeopardy
clause:
The constitutional prohibition against "double jeopardy" was
designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the
hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an
alleged offense ....

The underlying idea, one that is deeply

ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
25
found guilty.

Thus, the fundamental guarantee of the double jeopardy clause
shields criminal defendants from the power of the government to
subject them to multiple prosecutions for the same criminal offense 26
and "represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's
' 27
benefit in federal criminal proceedings.
The protection afforded criminal defendants by the double
jeopardy clause, however, is not absolute. Often the government's
interests in the enforcement of criminal law and the proper
administration of justice require the subordination of the countervailing interest of the individual to be free from multiple prosecutions. The resultant conflict of these competing values plays a major
role in the Supreme Court's decisions regarding double jeopardy. The
ultimate constitutionality of prosecutorial appeal of sentences may
best be evaluated by examining the manner in which the Court has
subtly balanced these countervailing interests in a variety of double
jeopardy contexts - reprosecution after mistrial, multiple proceed-

23. As one commentator observed, "[t]he most important event in the development
of double jeopardy was the occasion of its incorporation into the federal constitution.
This occurrence represents the transformation of a general maxim into a general rule

of public policy." J. SIGLER, supra note 22, at 34.
24 . 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
25. Id. at 187-88.
26. Schulhofer, supra note 22, at 454.
27. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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ings at the defendant's behest, reprosecution after acquittal,
reprosecution after conviction, and cases involving multiple punishment.
Reprosecution after Mistrial
The resolution of issues involving the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy ultimately depends upon balancing the
defendant's interest in freedom from multiple prosecutions or
punishments against the government's interest in maintaining and
enforcing the criminal law. When a criminal defendant has received
a final verdict of acquittal or conviction, this balancing process
invariably favors the accused, hence the absolute bar against
subsequent proceedings following final judgments. 28 When the first
trial terminates prematurely, however, the defendant's interest in
limiting the government to a single proceeding may often be
subordinated to the legitimate ends of criminal justice.
The problem of reprosecution after a mistrial has been declared
was first raised in United States v. Perez.29 There the trial judge,
without the consent of the defendant, discharged a jury which had
been unable to agree on a verdict. Finding no legal bar to retrial, Mr.
Justice Story enunciated principles that are still recognized today:
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested
Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from
giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity
for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject;
and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would
render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be
used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and
for very plain and obvious causes ....
This passage implies that a determination of "manifest necessity"
involves the balancing of individual interests against those of the
government. Although this weighing process is rarely explicit, it is
hypothesized that the consideration of individual versus government

28. See text accompanying notes 81 to 105 infra.

29. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
30. Id. at 580 (emphasis added). See, e.g., United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14

(1976); Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gunther, 546 F.2d
861 (10th Cir. 1976).
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interests forms the substratum of all reprosecution after mistrial
decisions whether or not they expressly invoke the "manifest
31
necessity" doctrine.
In Wade v. Hunter3 2 a court-martial, 33 after hearing evidence
and arguments of counsel, continued the case in order to procure the
attendance of two witnesses. Due to the tactical situation in the field
(the court-martial took place in Germany at the close of World War
II), the commanding officer withdrew the charges. Although
emphasizing the defendant's strong interest in having the verdict of
the initial jury, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause did
not bar the subsequent reinstitution of the charges and, ultimately,
the conviction:
The double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment... does

not mean that every time a defendant is put to trial before a
competent tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to end
in a final judgment.... What has been said is enough to show

that a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to
the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just
34
judgments.
The Court addressed the issue of double jeopardy in this context by
explicitly balancing the defendant's right to a single proceeding
before a particular tribunal against the government's interest in
conducting full and fair trials.

31. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505-10 (1978). The evolution of the
"manifest necessity" doctrine strongly suggests that the degree of necessity required
to justify the declaration of a mistrial over the defendant's objection, thereby
permitting reprosecution, varies according to the particular circumstances of the case.
A strict scrutiny standard will be applied when the basis of the mistrial is the absence
of an important prosecution witness or where there is reason to believe that the
prosecutor is merely seeking to gain a tactical advantage. Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1963). On the other hand, appellate courts will defer to the
discretion of the trial judge in deciding whether or not "manifest necessity" justifies
the discharge of a deadlocked jury, the classic ground for mistrial. United States v.
Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). Although the "manifest necessity" doctrine is
basically a restrictive concept designed to limit the possibility of unfair reprosecution,
in practice it is a flexible standard. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973).
32. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
33. Albeit a military trial, Wade and the principles enunciated therein have
frequently been discussed in later cases analyzing the effect of the double jeopardy
clause in the more traditional criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
34. 336 U.S. at 688-89.
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In United States v. Jorn 35 the "manifest necessity" doctrine was
invoked by the Supreme Court where the trial judge terminated the
proceedings after the jury had been sworn to allow non-party
prosecution witnesses to consult with their attorneys regarding the
possibility of self-incrimination. The plurality rejected "bright-line
rules" for declaring mistrials formulated in terms of specific
categories of circumstances3 6 or the intended beneficiary of the
ruling3 7 because such rules "would only disserve the vital competing
interests of the Government and the defendant."3 8 Emphasizing
these competing interests in cases where reprosecution is sought
after a sua sponte judicial mistrial declaration, the plurality opinion
observed:
[I]n the final analysis, the judge must always temper the
decision whether or not to abort the trial by considering the
importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to
conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a
tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.3 9
Thus, the Court acknowledged the interest of the defendant in the
decision of whether to proceed to verdict and stressed the different
considerations that apply when the defendant requests the mistrial.
The Jorn plurality concluded that the trial judge abused his
discretion in discharging the jury because the mistrial was declared
so abruptly that neither party had an opportunity to object, and the
prosecution was precluded from suggesting the possibility of a
continuance. 40 Thus, the judge failed to exercise sound discretion to
assure that there was a manifest necessity for the sua sponte
declaration of the mistrial, and consequently, the defendant's
reprosecution would violate the double jeopardy provision of the fifth
41
amendment.
The trial court in Illinois v. Somerville42 dismissed a defective
indictment subsequent to the swearing of the jury and over the
defendant's objection. The defendant was later convicted at a second
trial. While recognizing the trial court's discretion in terminating a

35. 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (plurality opinion).

36. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
37. See Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
38. 400 U.S. at 486 (Harlan, J., writing for plurality).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 486-87.
41. Id.
42. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
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criminal proceeding once jeopardy has attached, the Supreme Court
nevertheless emphasized the important interest of the defendant in
receiving the verdict of the jury first impaneled. Because further
proceedings in the first trial would have been virtually moot, the
Court found that this mistrial declaration served a "competing and
equally legitimate demand for public justice" 43 that outweighed the
defendant's interest in proceeding to verdict and met the standard of
"manifest necessity."
The issue of whether the double jeopardy clause is violated by
the retrial of defendants after a mistrial declaration at their request
4
In Dinitz,
was squarely presented in United States v. Dinitz.1
improper opening arguments by a defense counsel resulted in his
exclusion, and a motion for mistrial by the remaining defense
counsel was granted. Acknowledging that the Perez doctrine was
inapplicable because the mistrial was declared at the defendant's
request, the Court emphasized that "[dlifferent considerations obtain
... when the mistrial has been declared at the defendant's
request" 45 and that the defendant must "retain primary control over
the course to be followed in the event of such [prejudicial or
prosecutorial] error."'46 The Court observed that "a defendant's
mistrial request has objectives not unlike the interests served by the
Double Jeopardy Clause - the avoidance of the anxiety, expense,
and delay occasioned by multiple prosecutions." 47 Without resolving
the "manifest necessity" issue, the Court held that the double
jeopardy clause did not preclude further proceedings. A later case
summarized Dinitz's holding as follows:
Where the defendant, by requesting a mistrial, exercised his
choice in favor of terminating the trial, the Double Jeopardy
Clause generally would not stand in the way of reprosecution.
Only if the underlying error was "motivated by bad faith or

43. Id. at 471.
44. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
45. Id. at 607. Cf. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961) (trial judge declared
mistrial sua sponte, purporting to protect defendant against possible prejudice; noting
that this action was taken for sole benefit of accused, Court held that retrial was not
barred). The Gori ruling was seriously questioned in Jorn, which cast doubt on the
relevance of such a motivation for declaring a mistrial. 400 U.S. at 483. Nevertheless,
Gori demonstrates that the Court will apply the double jeopardy clause less rigorously
when it perceives the problem of reprosecution as arising from action taken by, or in
the interest of, the accused.
46. 424 U.S. at 609.
47. Id. at 608.
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undertaken to harass or prejudice,"
48
barrier to retrial.

...

would there be any

These decisions reflect the balancing approach adopted by the
Court and the tensions between the government's interest in
furthering the administration of justice and the accused's interest in
freedom from double jeopardy. Their major significance is the
impact of the reasoned choice of the individual and the absence of
governmental initiative upon the Court's balancing analysis. 49 The

rationale for limiting the government to a single proceeding in
which to vindicate its interest in the enforcement of the criminal
laws may be outweighed by the defendant's interest in exercising a
choice in the course to be followed at trial. For example, the
defendant may seek an immediate new trial via a motion for
mistrial. According to Dinitz, the fact that such an option rests with
the defendant is not inconsistent with the policies of the double
jeopardy clause.50 If this fundamental principle - according great
weight to the defendant's freedom to determine the course of the
proceedings - is applicable to other double jeopardy contexts,
government power to seek appellate review of sentences may be
unconstitutional.
Multiple Proceedings at the Behest of the
Defendant Following Conviction
The double jeopardy clause does not constitute an absolute bar
to retrial when the policy objectives of the prohibition are not

48. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 32-33 (1977) (quoting United States v. Dinitz,
424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)). See also Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 (1977).
49. When subsequent proceedings are the result of the defendant's efforts, the
policy objectives of the double jeopardy clause may not be applicable. In United States
v. Scott, 98 S.Ct. 2187 (1978) (5-4 decision), the district court granted the defendant's
motion for dismissal on the grounds of preindictment delay, and the government
appealed. The court of appeals, relying on Jenkins v. United States, 420 U.S. 358
(1975), concluded that the fifth amendment barred further prosecution, 544 F.2d 903,
903-04 (1977) (per curiam), because "'further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the
resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged, would have
been required upon reversal and remand.'" 98 S.Ct. at 2191 (quoting Jenkins v.
United States, 420 U.S. 358, 370 (1975)). See also note 96 infra. The Supreme Court,
drawing on the Dinitz rationale, concluded that "the Double Jeopardy Clause, which
guards against Government oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the
consequences of his voluntary choice." 98 S.Ct. at 2198. Explicitly overruling Jenkins,
the Scott Court held that when a defendant deliberately chooses to seek termination of
the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the
offense of which he is accused, he suffers no injury cognizable under the double
jeopardy clause. Id. at 2197-98.
50. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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applicable to the circumstances of the case or "some important
countervailing interest of proper judicial administration"'51 is
present. A defendant may not only be subjected to retrial for the
same offense when a mistrial has been declared because of
"manifest necessity" or at his request, but also when a conviction
has been set aside on appeal at the defendant's behest.
The double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a
defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the
proceedings leading to conviction.5 2 First enunciated in United
States v. Ball,5 3 this doctrine is a well-established part of our
constitutional jurisprudence. In Ball three defendants were charged
with murder under a defective indictment, and two of them were
convicted. Upon a writ of error to the Supreme Court, the convictions
were reversed. Subsequently, all three defendants were reindicted,
and convicted. The trial court had instructed the jury to find against
the defendants' pleas of former jeopardy. On a second appeal to the
Supreme Court, the plea of former jeopardy was discussed in two
contexts. With regard to the defendant who had initially been
acquitted, the Court declared that "a general verdict of acquittal
upon the issue of not guilty to an indictment undertaking to charge
murder, and not objected to before the verdict as insufficient in that
respect, is a bar to a second indictment for the same killing. ' 54 The
Court also recognized the principle that "the accused, whether
convicted or acquitted, is equally put in jeopardy at the first trial." 55
Without revealing its underlying rationale, the Court summarily
dispensed with the issue raised by the two remaining appellants:
"[I]t is quite clear that a defendant, who procures a judgment
against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew
upon the same indictment, or upon another indictment, for the same
offense of which he had been convicted. '5 6 Ball is considered to have
51. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973).
52. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964).
53. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
54. Id. at 669. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) and text
accompanying notes 83 to 89 infra.
55. 163 U.S. at 669.
56. Id. at 672. The Court cited its prior series of decisions in Hopt v. Utah, 104
U.S. 631 (1882), 110 U.S. 574 (1884), 114 U.S. 488 (1885), 120 U.S. 430 (1887). Although
the Hopt decisions do not discuss the double jeopardy implications of retrial after the
defendant has had the conviction set aside on appeal, they demonstrate the validity of
that principle. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. Pursuing
appellate remedies to the Supreme Court, he succeeded in having his conviction set
aside but was subsequently retried. This pattern was repeated twice, and it was not
until after the defendant's fourth trial that his conviction was finally affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
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established the principle "that this constitutional guarantee [of
freedom from double jeopardy] imposes no limitations whatever
upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting
his first conviction set aside," 57 despite the fact that the Court's
opinion is devoid of any analysis justifying its interpretation of
double jeopardy principles.
Two principal theories, one based on "waiver" and the other on
the concept of "continuing jeopardy," have emerged to justify retrial
under the circumstances present in Ball. The "waiver" theory was
first discussed in Trono v. United States.58 There the defendants
were acquitted of murder but convicted of assault. On appeal, the
Philippine Supreme Court, which was empowered to determine the
59
guilt or innocence of defendants and to impose sentence on appeal,
reversed the assault conviction but convicted the defendants of
homicide. 0 In the Supreme Court, the appellants contended that
their acquittal of murder by the trial court barred the later
conviction of homicide. In effect, the appellants argued that the
assault conviction, in conjunction with the acquittal of murder,
operated to restrict a conviction upon retrial to assault.61 The Court
found Kepner v. United States, 62 which had held that government
appeal of an acquittal was barred by the double jeopardy clause,
inapplicable:
[The defendants] appealedfrom the judgment of the court of first
instance and the Government had no voice in the matter of the
appeal, it simply followed them to the court to which they
appealed. We regard that fact as materialand controlling.The
difference is vital between an attempt by the Government to
review the verdict or decision of acquittal in the court of first
instance and the action of the accused person in himself
appealing from the judgment and asking for its reversal ....

63

57. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969) (emphasis added) (footnote

omitted).
58. 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
59. See note 84 infra.
60. Under the applicable criminal code, the crime of homicide was equivalent to
second degree murder. Id. at 522. The crime charged in the complaint, murder,
actually encompassed three degrees of crime, first degree murder, second degree
murder or homicide, and assault.
61. This argument was founded on double jeopardy principles. The Court applied
the pertinent language of the act of Congress then in force in the Philippine Islands
as it would the fifth amendment prohibition. See Ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691 (1902). See
also note 85 infra.
62. 195 U.S. 100 (1904). See text accompanying notes 83 to 89 infra.
63. 199 U.S. at 529-30 (emphasis added).
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Acknowledging that the accused had been placed in jeopardy of
conviction of a crime for which he had been acquitted, the Court
reasoned that by appealing his conviction he waived the right to
invoke the plea of former jeopardy. By seeking a potentially greater
benefit, the accused forfeited the protection of the double jeopardy
provision and reopened the entire controversy upon retrial in the
Philippine Supreme Court. The Court held that retrial was permissible in this case, and stressed the crucial distinction between
proceedings initiated by the government and those initiated by the
defendant in concluding:
As the judgment stands before he appeals, it is a complete bar to
any further prosecution for the offense set forth in the
indictment, or of any lesser degree thereof. No power can wrest
from him the right to so use that judgment, but if he chooses to
appeal from it and to ask for its reversal he thereby waives, if
successful, his right to avail himself of the former acquittal of
the greater offense, contained in the judgment which he has
himself procured to be reversed.6 4

The waiver doctrine has been applied in a number of cases in which
sentences were increased following conviction upon retrial at the
accused's behest. 65
The theory that the defendant actually waives his plea of former
jeopardy by appealing his conviction rests on questionable constitutional grounds. Waiver in this context has been distinguished from
the principles governing the waiver of recognized constitutional
rights.6 6 In United States v.Dinitz6 7 the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the contention that "the permissibility of a retrial following

64. Id. at 533.
65. E.g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Ocampo v. United States, 234
U.S. 91 (1914); Flemister v. United States, 207 U.S. 372 (1907). In Stroud the
defendant, popularly known as the "Birdman of Alcatraz," appealed and had his
original conviction and death sentence reversed. A year after the first trial, he was
retried and again convicted, but the sentence precluded capital punishment. Stroud
was again successful on appeal and was tried for a third time. This last conviction
resulted in the reimposition of the death sentence. Relying on Trono, the Court upheld
the verdict and sentence, observing, "thus the plaintiff in error himself invoked the
action of the court which resulted in a further trial. In such cases he is not placed in
second jeopardy within the meaning of the Constitution." 251 U.S. at 18.
66. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Johnson delineated the standards
governing the determination whether defendants have competently waived their
constitutional right to counsel, stating that a "waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464.
67. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
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a mistrial or a reversal of a conviction on appeal depends on a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of a constitutional
right." 68 The notion that a defendant has waived, in any sense, a
significant constitutional right to ensure the correction of erroneous
proceedings is by no means well-settled. 69 The dubious constitutional
underpinnings of the waiver theory have not gone unnoticed, and at
least one Supreme Court decision has denounced that theory as
70
"totally unsound and indefensible."
The "continuing jeopardy" theory, a second justification for the
Ball principle, is that the defendant's appeal merely perpetuates the
first jeopardy. Therefore, subsequent proceedings do not constitute a
"second" jeopardy. This notion of continuing jeopardy was introduced, albeit in a different context, by Mr. Justice Holmes in his
dissent in Kepner v. United States.71 In support of the proposition
that the government could appeal an acquittal, Mr. Justice Holmes
argued that an accused is in jeopardy for the duration of each cause
of action and that jeopardy continues throughout the proceedings
related to that action.7 2 This broad characterization of double
jeopardy, however, has never been adopted by a majority of the
Court, 73 even though it has been advocated in the context of a
74
defendant's appeal of a conviction and subsequent retrial.
The continuing jeopardy concept was further elaborated in Price
v. Georgia75 in which the Court held that retrial after appeal was
confined to a lesser included offense when the original conviction
had been limited to that offense to the exclusion of a greater one.
Conceding that it had "consistently refused to rule that jeopardy for
an offense continues after an acquittal,"7 6 the Court nevertheless
accepted "the concept of continuing jeopardy implicit in the Ball
case" 77 which permitted retrial after the conviction had been set

68. Id. at 609-10 n.11.
69. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135-36 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
70. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 197 (1957) (limiting Trono to its facts).
See text accompanying notes 117 to 123 infra.
71. 195 U.S. 100, 134-37 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See text accompanying

notes 83 to 89 infra.
72. 195 U.S. at 134-36.
73. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 369 (1975).
74. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193 (1957). In Green the Court
categorically rejected Holmes' expansive theory but did indicate that the continuing
jeopardy doctrine was more palatable than the waiver theory. Id. at 196-97. See text
accompanying notes 117 to 123 infra.
75. 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
76. Id. at 329.

77. Id.
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aside at the defendant's request. 78 The Court admitted, however, that
the concept of continuing jeopardy rested on "an amalgam of
interests - e.g., fairness to society, lack of finality, and limited
' 79
waiver, among others.
Despite these efforts to rationalize Ball, it appears that the
power to retry defendants who succeed in having their first
conviction set aside is ultimately grounded in an accommodation of
competing interests. As the foregoing analysis suggests, the central
objective of the double jeopardy clause is not satisfied by dogmatic
adherence to any particular doctrine, but by the delicate balancing
of countervailing interests:
While different theories have been advanced to support the
permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball principle are the
implications of that principle for the sound administration of
justice. Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a
fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is
clear after he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high price
indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity
from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute
reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction .... In
reality, therefore, the practice of retrial serves defendants' rights
as well as society's interests.80
A determination of the constitutionality of prosecutorial appeal of
sentences entails a similar balancing process - one that is sensitive
to both the traditional double jeopardy protections against governmental harassment and multiple prosecutions and to the legitimate
goals of the criminal justice system.

78. The availability of double jeopardy protection to defendants who succeed in
having their first conviction set aside was significantly broadened in Burks v. United
States, 98 S. Ct. 2141 (1978). There the appellate court reversed the defendant's
conviction, finding the prosecution's evidence regarding his mental condition
insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. Distinguishing Ball and its progeny as
reversals predicated on trial error rather than insufficiency of the evidence, the
Supreme Court concluded that reversal on the latter grounds barred further
prosecution because "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the
purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it
failed to muster in the first proceeding." Id. at 2147. Consequently, a second trial is
precluded "once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, [and]
the only 'just' remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of
acquittal." Id. at 2150.
79. 398 U.S. at 329 n.4.
80. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
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Reprosecution After Acquittal
In the United States the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy has developed into a doctrine broader than its common law
predecessor.8 1 Even in its narrowest sense, however, the prohibition
against being placed "twice in jeopardy" for the same offense shields
the accused from government-initiated proceedings based upon the
same offense following a final acquittal. Reprosecution of individuals after a final judgment of acquittal is the most salient example of
double jeopardy, clearly contravening the policies of finality and
freedom from governmental harassment embodied in the fifth
82
amendment.
In the landmark decision of Kepner v. United States,13 the
Supreme Court acknowledged and reaffirmed this fundamental tenet
of double jeopardy jurisprudence. Kepner, an attorney practicing in
the Philippine Islands, was charged with embezzling a client's
funds. He was tried for that offense, and the trial court, sitting
without jury, acquitted him. Subsequently, an appeal was initiated
by the United States. The defendant's acquittal was reversed by the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, which found him guilty
8 4
and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of nearly two years.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court decided the case as if
the fifth amendment's prohibition were fully applicable.8 5 Analyzing
the history of the double jeopardy clause in this country and its
common law origins, the Court had little difficulty concluding that
Kepner's conviction was a violation of the double jeopardy clause,
notwithstanding Mr. Justice Holmes' vigorous dissent.8 6 Finding
that "[a]t the common law, protection from second jeopardy for the
same offense clearly included immunity from second prosecution
where the court having jurisdiction had acquitted the accused of the

81. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
82. This principle was most recently discussed in United States v. Scott, 98 S. Ct.
2187 (1978). While limiting the protection afforded defendants by the double jeopardy
clause with respect to midtrial dismissals, the Court reaffirmed the finality of an
"acquittal," albeit narrowly defined, and reiterated that any governmental initiative
towards overturning an acquittal is precluded. Id. at 2193.
83, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
84, The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was empowered to determine
guilt or innocence of defendants and to impose sentences upon appeal. Id. at 110-11.
85. The Philippine Islands had only recently become a United States territory,
and there was some conflict between existing Spanish law and temporary legislation
passed by Congress on July 1, 1902. The act provided for the administration of the
government and guaranteed, inter alia, that "no person for the same offense shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment." Ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691 (1902).
86. See text accompanying notes 71 to 72 supra.
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offense, ' 87 the Court later concluded: "It is, then, the settled law of
this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted
by a verdict duly rendered. . . *"88Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice
Day noted the impact of this principle upon the government's right
to appeal on acquittal, stating that "'the defendant (or his
representative) is the only party who can have either a new trial or a
writ of error in a criminal case; and that a judgment in his favor is
89
final and conclusive.'"
The Kepner decision recognized the basic protections afforded by
the double jeopardy clause and the policy of finality that must
attach to guard against multiple proceedings and their concomitant
hazards. Although the process is not clearly evident in Kepner, the
Court has tacitly balanced the legitimate interests of the defendant
against those of the government in such situations and, in the case
of acquittal, has determined that the accused's interests outweigh
those of the government in reprosecution. The rationale of this
approach was articulated in a passage from the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Arizona v. Washington.90 Writing for the Court,
Mr. Justice Stevens observed:
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal. The public
interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so strong that an
acquitted defendant may not be retried even though "the
acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation."
See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143. If the
innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final
judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second
trial would be unfair. 91
There are several qualifications of this apparently unequivocal
rule against retrial after acquittal. First, the court acquitting the
accused must have had jurisdiction over the case, 92 because a
judgment of acquittal entered by a court without jurisdiction is
absolutely void and does not, therefore, stand as a bar to the
subsequent prosecution. 93 Arguably, the interest of the defendant in

87. 195 U.S. at 126.
88. Id. at 130.
89. Id. at 128 (quoting United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892)).
90.
91.
92.
93.

434 U.S. 497 (1978).
Id. at 503.
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126-28 (1904).
Id. at 129-30. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1896).
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freedom from the anxiety and stress of a criminal proceeding would
also have some bearing on this situation, but the jurisdiction rule is
well-settled, ostensibly on the grounds that the accused was not
subject to the risk of conviction and punishment in the absence of
proper jurisdiction, and the interests of the government would be
ignored if the void proceeding resulted in immunity for the accused.
Second, doubly jeopardy does not forbid reinstatement of a
guilty verdict when a jury found the defendant guilty but the judge
granted the defendant's post-verdict dismissal motion. In United
States v. Wilson 94 the Court emphasized that the protection against
governmental appeal did not attach because the threat of a second
trial was not present. The Court concluded that:
Although review of any ruling of law discharging a defendant
obviously enhances the likelihood of conviction and subjects him
to continuing expense and anxiety, a defendant has no
legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error
could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial before
a second trier of fact. 95
Because reversal on appeal would entail, at most, the reinstatement
of the jury's verdict of guilty, review of the order of dismissal does
96
not offend the purposes of the double jeopardy clause.
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,97 raises a third issue
complicating the application of the Kepner rule: in some cases the

94. 420 U.s. 332 (1975).
95. Id. at 345. Although Wilson concerns retrial after a dismissal rather than an
acquittal, the former does bear some resemblance to the latter. The definition of
"acquittal" for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis remains nebulous. See United
States v. Scott, 98 S. Ct. 2187, 2204-06 (1978) (5-4 decision) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. The Wilson doctrine was limited by United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358
(1975), issued on the same day. There the trial court had dismissed the indictment
following a nonjury trial, in effect acquitting the defendant. Its resolution of the issue
of guilt was ambiguous. The Supreme Court interpreted Wilson narrowly, limiting
that decision's intrusion on the policy of finality incorporated in the double jeopardy
clause, and held that the government's appeal was barred:
[Ilt is enough for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . that further
proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to
the elements of the offense charged, would have been required upon reversal
and remand. Even if the District Court were to receive no additional evidence,
it would still be necessary for it to make supplemental findings. The trial,
which could have resulted in a judgment of conviction, has long since
terminated in respondent's favor. To subject him to any further such
proceedings at this stage would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Id. at 370. Jenkins, however, was recently overruled in United States v. Scott, 98 S. Ct.
2187 (1978) (5-4 decision). See note 49 supra.
97. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).

1978]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL REFORM ACT

judgment may be characterized as something other than a formal
acquittal. In Martin Linen, the trial court had granted a motion for
acquittal by the defendant after a deadlocked jury had been
discharged. The Supreme Court rejected the government's effort to
distinguish this case from Kepner strictly in terms of the timing of
the mistrial and acquittal decisions. Because a mistrial was declared
before the entry of a formal judgment of acquittal, the government
contended that Kepner's prohibition against double jeopardy,
insofar as it concerned governmental appeal of acquittals, was
inapplicable. 98 Eschewing "artificial distinctions" 99 and finding that
the acquittal was one in substance as well as in form, 100 the Court
held that the government's appeal was impermissible. The government's argument in Martin Linen, although unsuccessful, raises an
important question as to the application of the Kepner principle
when the judgment may be characterized as something other than a
formal acquittal.1 0 '
Reprosecution after Conviction
It is also well-settled that double jeopardy principles prohibit
reprosecution for the same offense after conviction. For example, the
Court in Martin Linen observed that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause
also accords nonappealable finality to a verdict of guilty entered by
judge or jury, disabling the Government from seeking to punish a
defendant more than once for the same offense."' 1 2 In Wilson, the
Court reiterated this basic principle: "When a defendant has been
once convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of
fairness and finality require that he not be subjected to the
possibility of further punishment by being again tried or sentenced
for the same offense."'10 3 These statements not only indicate the
Court's concern about multiple prosecutions but also multiple
punishment. Indeed, these two considerations overlap to a great
extent, 0 4 for whenever the Court describes the double jeopardy
clause as a shield against reprosecutions for the same offense after
conviction, 0 5 it is relying, in part, upon the policy against subjecting
the accused to the psychological, physical, and financial burdens of
98. Id. at 572.
99. Id. at 574.
100. Id. at 572.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See note 95 supra.
430 U.S. at 569 n.6.
420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 106 to 191 infra.
E.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711. 717 (1969).
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a criminal proceeding. However, the underlying motivation of the
government's reprosecution for the same offense after conviction is
the desire to secure a satisfactory punishment, that is, a more severe
punishment than that originally imposed. Thus, the protection
against reprosecution after conviction is designed to prevent what
would amount to multiple punishments for the same offense at the
behest of the government.
As Martin Linen and Wilson suggest, governmental interest in
the administration of justice may limit the constitutional policy of
finality embodied in the double jeopardy clause under certain
circumstances. The constitutional policy does, however, insulate the
accused from further proceedings once a final judgment of acquittal
or conviction has been rendered, and this should be borne in mind
when the impact of the double jeopardy clause in the area of
sentencing is examined.
MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT

The threshold question in evaluating the constitutionality of
prosecutorial appeal of sentences is the applicability of the double
jeopardy clause to punishment, that is, to sentencing. Although
many decisions focus only upon the risk of conviction and the
10 6 it is
hazards of subjecting the individual to multiple proceedings,
well settled that the double jeopardy clause incorporates "the
principle that no man shall more than once be placed in peril of legal
penalties upon the same accusation."' 1 7 While significant liabilities
attach to conviction alone, the risk of punishment - "jeopardy of
life or limb" - must be the paramount concern of the prohibition
against double jeopardy. As the Supreme Court in North Carolinav.
Pearce0 8 observed, "[t]he theory of double jeopardy is that a person
need run the gantlet only once. The gantlet is the risk of the range of
punishment which the ...

Government imposes for that particular

conduct."'1 9 It is primarily the risk of the penal sanctions connected
106. See text accompanying notes 24 to 27 supra.

107. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1874).
108. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
109. Id. at 727 (Douglas, J., concurring). In the proposed version of the Bill of
Rights that he presented to the House of Representatives in June 1789, James
Madison included a ban against double jeopardy. Madison's provision read: "No
person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment
or one trial for the same offence." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (1789). This provision
was replaced by the present language in order to clarify the law that allows a
defendant to seek a new trial on appeal of his conviction. The change was not
intended to alter the ban against double punishment. Sigler, A History of Double
Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 304-06 (1963).
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with criminal convictions that actuate the policies of the double
jeopardy clause.
From an early date, the Supreme Court has recognized that
certain forms of double punishment were prohibited by the fifth
amendment.1 10 In Pearcethe Court stated that the guarantee against
double jeopardy "has been said to consist of three separate
constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects
against multiple punishments for the same offense.",' The constitutionality of S. 1437's proposal to permit the government to petition
the court of appeals for an increase in the sentence imposed by the
trial court'1 2 must therefore be viewed as contingent upon the scope
of the fifth amendment's prohibition against multiple punishments
for the same offense.
Sentencing after Retrial
Pearce is one of the few Supreme Court decisions that applies
double jeopardy principles in the sentencing context. In that case the
Court declared that when a criminal conviction has been set aside at
the behest of the defendant and a new trial ordered, imposition of a
more severe sentence upon reconviction does not constitute "multiple
3
punishment" within the ambit of the double jeopardy clause."
Although the Pearce Court did not explicitly rely on the waiver
doctrine, first enunciated in Trono 1 4 and later adopted in Stroud v.
United States," 5 it nevertheless invoked a similar rationale. The
Court observed that the power of the government to retry the
accused and to impose a greater sentence upon reconviction after the
defendant's successful appeal "rests ultimately on the premise that

110. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 728-29 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 717 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
112. See text accompanying notes 16 to 19 supra.
113. 395 U.S. at 721. Relying heavily upon Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15
(1919), see note 65 supra, the Pearce Court concluded that "a corollary of the power to
retry a defendant is the power, upon the defendant's reconviction, to impose whatever
sentence may be legally authorized, whether or not it is greater than the sentence
imposed after the first conviction." 395 U.S. at 720 (footnote omitted). The Court
further held, however, that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment bars
increased sentences upon reconviction absent an affirmative showing by the court of
reasons "based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the
part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."
Id. at 726.
114. See text accompanying notes 58 to 65 supra.
115. 251 U.S. 15 (1919). See note 65 supra.
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the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly
116
nullified and the slate wiped clean."
The Court's reliance upon a concept resembling the waiver
doctrine promulgated in Trono is at odds with an earlier decision,
Green v. United States.1 17 In Green the defendant was tried under an
indictment which included one count of arson and one count of
murder in the first degree. On the latter count, the jury was
instructed as to both first and second degree murder and returned a
verdict finding the defendant guilty of arson and of second degree
murder; but it was silent on the first degree murder charge. The
judge accepted the verdict and discharged the jury. On appeal, the
defendant succeeded in overturning the second degree murder
conviction. On remand, however, he was tried for first degree murder
under the original indictment, found guilty of that charge, and
sentenced to death. Following an affirmance by the circuit court,
Green appealed to the Supreme Court which, in a five to four
decision, reversed, holding that the conviction of first degree murder
placed the defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The
Court based its decision on two independent grounds. First, the
jury's verdict was an "implied acquittal" of the charge of first degree
murder and therefore served as a bar to subsequent prosecution.
Rejecting the Trono waiver doctrine, 1 8 the Court ruled that
contesting a conviction for a lesser degree offense does not waive the
defense which the acquittal affords: "[I]t is wholly fictional to say
that [the defendant] 'chooses' to forego his constitutional defense of
former jeopardy on a charge of murder in the first degree in order to
secure reversal of an erroneous conviction of the lesser offense. In
short, he has no meaningful choice." 1 9 Second, the Court decided
that regardless of the implied acquittal rationale, the jury had been
dismissed prior to returning an express verdict on the charge and
without the defendant's consent. Thus, under established principles
of double jeopardy, a second prosecution was precluded. 20
The significance of the Green decision is twofold. First, it
virtually overrules Trono. Despite the Court's efforts to distinguish
that case as a decision construing a statutory provision in the
Philippine Islands, 12' the Court undermined the conceptual basis of

116. 395 U.S. at 721 (emphasis added).

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

355 U.S. 184 (1957) (5-4 decision).
See text accompanying notes 58 to 70 supra.
355 U.S. at 192.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 194-97. But see id. at 205-14 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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the Trono opinion. The position adopted by the Court in Green thus
brings into question cases such as Stroud,122 which rest entirely on
Trono. Moreover, the erosion of Trono's waiver theory significantly
diminishes, if it does not destroy, the precedential force of the earlier
decisions permitting increased sentences on retrial which were
invoked by the Supreme Court in Pearce.Second, Green advances a
theory of "implied acquittal" 123 which appears to embody the
established principles of finality and freedom from reprosecution
following an acquittal or conviction. Under this doctrine if the
accused is found guilty of a lesser included offense, the verdict
operates as an implied acquittal for all greater offenses. In effect, the
original conviction serves as a ceiling, and defendants may not be
reprosecuted for a greater offense even though they appeal their
conviction for the lesser offense. Under Green the defendant is not
deemed to have waived the benefit of the former jeopardy plea that
an acquittal provides.
The implied acquittal theory may also be extended to the
sentencing context. The defendant's original sentence is presumably
chosen from a range of penalties prescribed by statute for the offense
and the imposition of a particular sentence by a judge, or in rare
instances a jury, coupled with the failure to impose a more severe
penalty, should immunize the defendant from the threat of a harsher
sentence in a manner analogous to Green. Upon reconviction double
jeopardy principles would only permit resentencing to a punishment
equal to, or less severe than, that originally imposed.124 One problem
with this approach is that it requires the concept of acquittal,
express or implied, to be applied to sentencing without the
concomitant element of the prior reversal of a conviction of a lesser
degree of offense than that charged. 125 Arguments that the
application of the implied acquittal theory is incongruous in the
sentencing context were addressed by the Supreme Court of
California in People v. Henderson.126 The Henderson court held that
the prohibition against double jeopardy precluded the imposition of
the death penalty upon retrial after the reversal of a prior conviction
for which the defendant had received a sentence of life imprison-

122. See note 65 supra.
123. 355 U.S. at 190.
124. See Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: HarsherPenalties and the "Successful"
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 632-35 (1965).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968).
126. 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
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ment. Writing for the court, Justice Traynor explicitly relied upon
the Green analysis:
Since the Green and Gomez cases have now established that a
reversed conviction of a lesser degree of a crime precludes
conviction of a higher degree on retrial, the rationale of the
Stroud and Grill cases has been vitiated. It is immaterial to the
basic purpose of the constitutional provision against double
jeopardy whether the Legislature divides a crime into different
degrees carrying different punishments or allows the court or
127
jury to fix different punishments for the same crime.
Thus, the Henderson court found the sentencing and trial contexts
sufficiently analogous to justify applying the implied acquittal
rationale to sentencing.
While it appears that the Supreme Court effectively rejected the
application of the implied acquittal doctrine in a sentencing context
in Pearce, that decision does not support the constitutionality of the
government's appeal of sentences. That issue was simply not before
the Court. 128 The essence of the Pearce decision is revealed in the
first few words of the majority opinion: "When at the behest of the
defendant .... ,129 The Court's analysis, its invocation of precedent,
and its application of the principles of the double jeopardy clause
support the conclusion that it was focusing only on the propriety of
additional proceedings initiated by the defendant, not by the
government. In the context of traditional double jeopardy analysis,
the fundamental nature of the distinction between voluntary actions
by defendants which subject them to multiple proceedings and
actions by the government which subject defendants to repeated
attempts to convict and to punish, is apparent. 13° In contrast to the
stringent limitations placed on the power of the government, "[a]
very different situation is presented, with considerations persuasive
127. Id. at 497, 386 P.2d at 686, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
128. The Court stated, "we deal here, not with increases in existing sentences,
but with the imposition of wholly new sentences after wholly new trials." 395 U.S. at
722. The justification offered in support of proposed 28 U.S.C. §3725, see text
accompanying notes 16 to 19 supra, by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary relies
primarily on Pearce for the proposition that the appellate review system is "not
objectionable on constitutional grounds." S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1057
(1977). Although there is no indication that it was aware of the fundamental
distinction that renders Pearce inapposite, the Committee does strenghten its
argument by referring to United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), which upheld a
government appeal from a dismissal of an indictment. See text accompanying notes
94 to 96 supra.
129. 395 U.S. at 713.
130. E.g., United States v. Scott, 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1978). See note 49 supra.
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of a different legal result, when the defendant is not content with his
conviction, but appeals and obtains a reversal.' 13 1 Arguments
relying on Pearceto support appellate review of sentences initiated
by the government are, at best, unpersuasive; they ignore a
fundamental distinction in the case law interpreting the double
132
jeopardy clause.
ProsecutorialAppeal of Sentences
Should S. 1437 be enacted, litigation challenging the constitutionality of section 3725(b) 13 3 will undoubtedly follow. Although the
constitutionality of a statute authorizing the government to seek
increased sentences through appellate review has never been
addressed by the Supreme Court,13 4 there is federal case law which
suggests serious constitutional objections to such a policy. Dictum in
at least one Supreme Court decision, Reid v. Covert,135 indicates a
predisposition to rule against prosecutorial appeals. Discussing the
applicability of the Bill of Rights to military trials, Mr. Justice
Black, writing for a plurality, stated "[imn Swaim v. United States,
165 U.S. 553, this Court held that the President or commanding
officer had power to return a case to a court-martial for an increase
in sentence. If the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amend136
ment were applicable such a practice would be unconstitutional."'
Analysis of other cases tends to support this position.
131. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 214 (1957) (5-4 decision) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
132. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1969).
133. Section 3725(b) is quoted at text accompanying note 16 supra.
134. Although never decided by the Supreme Court, this issue has been presented
for its consideration. In Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943), two issues were
raised: (1) whether the Probation Act (formerly 18 U.S.C. §§ 724-728 (1940) (current
version at scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.)) permitted revoking probation, setting
aside a two-year suspended sentence, and resentencing to a three-year term, and if so,
(2) whether the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy prohibited such
an increase. Since the Court answered the first question in the negative, it did not
reach the second issue. Notably, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent found no
double jeopardy bar to such a power. 320 U.S. at 276. In Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct.
2699 (1978), a section of Maryland's Juvenile Causes statute, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-813 (Cum. Supp. 1977), which provided for prosecutorial appeal from a
juvenile court master's finding of non-delinquency ultimately leading to a second trial
before a juvenile court judge, was challenged as violative of the double jeopardy
clause. With regard to eight of the nine juvenile parties, the state sought to overturn
the master's finding of non-delinquency. The constitutionality of prosecutorial appeal
of sentences could have been in issue when the state sought, subsequent to the
conviction of the one remaining appellee, a second sentencing proceeding; however,
this question was neither briefed, argued, nor even mentioned in the Court's opinion.
135. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
136. Id. at 37 n.68 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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In holding that "multiple punishment" violative of the double
jeopardy clause does not exist when a conviction is set aside at the
defendant's behest, a retrial is ordered, and a greater sentence is
imposed upon reconviction, Pearce marks one end of the double
jeopardy continuum 37 At the other extreme is the principle
established in the landmark decision Ex parte Lange.138 In that case
the defendant was tried and convicted of appropriating mailbags for
his own use. The applicable statute provided for imprisonment for
not more than one year or a fine of not less than $10 or more than
$200. Lange was subsequently sentenced to one year's imprisonment
and fined $200. He began serving the jail term immediately, and on
the following day paid the fine. Five days after the original sentence
was imposed the defendant was brought before the circuit court on a
writ of habeas corpus. Realizing the sentencing error, the judge
vacated the former judgment and imposed a one year jail term. The
problem was that one legitimate punishment, the fine, had already
been fully suffered. Recognizing that there must be limits on the
power exercised by a court over its own judgments, orders, and
decrees during the term at which they are first made, 139 the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a court can, after execution of
one of the alternative punishments available, vacate that judgment
and enter another. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Miller
observed that the protection of former jeopardy is primarily
protection against twice being punished for the same offense. 140
Focusing on the fact that the defendant had already paid the fine,
the Court found that he had fully suffered the requisite punishment
and could not be subjected to an additional penalty for the same
offense. It took the position that although the principles of double
jeopardy guard against the risks inherent in a second trial after final
judgment, the core protection afforded by a plea of former jeopardy
is aimed at multiple punishment.'4 ' Ex parte Lange involved a
137. 395 U.S. at 719-21. See text accompanying notes 113 to 116 supra.

138. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
139. Id. at 167-68. This aspect of the case is no longer significant because terms of
district courts were abolished by 28 U.S.C. § 138 (1976).
140. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 168. The Court further stated: "The common law not only
prohibited a second punishment for the same offence, but it went further and forbid
[sic] a second trial for the same offence, whether the accused had suffered punishment
or not, and whether in the former trial he had been acquitted or convicted." Id. at 169.
141. The Court observed:
For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one
trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict?
Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, he can never be tried
again for that offence? Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being a
second time found guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the

1978]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL REFORM ACT

blatant example of double punishment that was properly condemned
as violative of the double jeopardy clause. Lange presented a
relatively narrow factual situation, however, and significant
problems remain in determining the scope of its holding. The
"multiple punishment" was an additional sentence imposed after the
completion of the maximum authorized punishment, and the Court's
holding may arguably be limited to that fact situation.
The underlying rationale of Lange may also be logically
extended to cases in which a second sentence is added to one still
being served. This argument appears to have been accepted in
Murphy v. Massachusetts,142 where the issue was the constitutional-

ity of imposing a greater sentence after the original sentence had
been reversed on appeal by the defendant. Murphy had been
convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of ten to fifteen years. Approximately two and one-half years later,
on a writ of error by the defendant, the appellate court reversed the
sentence on constitutional grounds and resentenced him to another
term of imprisonment which was arguably longer given the terms of
the original sentence. 143 The Court held that the plea of former
jeopardy was unavailable when a sentence was reversed or vacated
at the request of the accused.

second conviction which is the real danger guarded against by the
Constitution. But if, after judgment has been rendered on the conviction, and
the sentence of that judgment executed on the criminal, he can be again
sentenced on that conviction to another and different punishment, or to
endure the same punishment a second time, is the constitutional restriction of
any value? Is not its intent and its spirit in such a case as much violated as if
a new trial had been had, and on a second conviction a second punishment
inflicted?
Id. at 173. The Lange doctrine was applied to resolve a secondary issue in Pearce.
Invoking the prohibition against multiple punishment discussed in Lange, the Pearce
Court held that the Constitution required that "credit" be given for punishment
already suffered whenever a sentence for the same offense was imposed upon retrial.
395 U.S. at 717-18.
142. 177 U.S. 155 (1900).
143. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed with Murphy's
contention that the statute under which he had originally been sentenced "was
unconstitutional so far as it related to past offenses." Id. at 156. The court therefore
remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the proper
statute. The trial court, "being manifestly of [the] opinion that imprisonment for
twelve years and six months was the punishment demanded under the circumstances," id. at 161, made allowance for the time Murphy had previously served and
imposed a sentence of 9 years, 10 months, and 21 days. The total time Murphy would
have to serve under the second sentence was arguably greater than the time he would
have had to serve under the first sentence because the statute relied upon in the first
proceeding provided for "liberty at the expiration of the minimum term" under certain
conditions. Id. at 160-61. The minimum term under the first sentence was 10 years.
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The decision of the Court in Murphy is important in two
respects. First, it highlights the fundamental double jeopardy
distinction between appeals sought by the government and those at
the behest of the accused: "In prosecuting his former writ of error
plaintiff in error voluntarily accepted the result, and it is well settled
that a convicted person cannot by his own act avoid the jeopardy in
which he stands, and then assert it as a bar to subsequent
jeopardy." 144 The emphasis upon the defendant's efforts to bring
about the subsequent proceedings is consistent with the later Trono,
Stroud, and Pearce decisions. It is important to note that Murphy
applies this concept directly to a defendant's appeal of sentence as
opposed to proceedings concerned primarily with the underlying
conviction. To that extent, there appears to be no distinction between
verdicts and sentences in the application of double jeopardy
principles. Second, the Court's opinion apparently adopted Lange's
"multiple punishment" analysis and accepted the broader position,
suggested in Lange, that increasing the sentence while the original
one is being served is also prohibited:
We repeat that this is not a case in which the court
undertook to impose in invitum a second or additional sentence
for the same offense, or to substitute one sentence for another.
On the contrary, plaintiff in error availed himself of his right to
have the first sentence annulled so that another sentence might
145
be rendered.
It appears that Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in the first phrase was
referring to the imposition of a second sentence after full execution
of the first. If the words "to substitute one sentence for another"
carry any independent meaning, however, they must refer to
increasing an existing sentence, which would occur on appellate
review when the court of appeals substitutes its greater sentence for
that imposed by the trial court. Thus, dictum in Murphy strongly
implies that the Court is willing to recognize a definition of "multiple

Under the second sentence, Murphy would have to have served 12 years and 6
months.
The defendant also raised a second double jeopardy issue. Originally, he had
been sentenced to one day of solitary confinement. Upon resentencing, he was
sentenced to an additional day of solitary confinement despite service of the original
term. The Supreme Court summarily rejected Murphy's contention that the sentence
of the additional day constituted double jeopardy.
144. Id. at 158.
145. Id. at 160 (dictum) (emphasis added).
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punishment" broader than that expressed in the narrow holding of
Lange.
Further insight into the Court's attitude toward this issue is
afforded by a later decision, United States v. Benz. 146 There the
defendant pled guilty to a charge of violating the National
Prohibition Act and was sentenced to a ten-month prison term.
While serving his sentence, the defendant petitioned the federal
district court for modification of his punishment, and that court
entered an order reducing the term of imprisonment to six months.
On appeal by the government, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit certified to the Supreme Court the issue whether a
federal court had the power to reduce the term of imprisonment
under these circumstances. The Supreme Court explained that "[t]he
general rule is that judgments, decrees and orders are within the
control of the court during the term at which they were made"'147 and
that this rule applied equally to criminal and civil matters "provided
the punishment be not augmented. 1' 48 The Court held the reduction
permissible and in dictum observed:
The distinction that the court during the same term may
amend a sentence so as to mitigate the punishment, but not so
as to increase it, is not based upon the ground that the court has
lost control of the judgment in the latter case, but upon the
ground that to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to
double punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no person
shall "be subject for the same offense [sic] to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb."' 49
Although Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for a unanimous Court,
cited Lange, he did not attempt to rationalize the (distinguishing)
fact that Lange considered only the problem of imposing additional
punishment on a defendant who had already completed the lawful
sentence.
The Benz and Lange decisions offer substantial support for
double jeopardy arguments against statutory procedures for appellate review of sentences on the government's initiative. While this
conclusion is founded primarily on dicta, there is no persuasive

146. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
147. Id. at 306. See note 139 supra.
148. 282 U.S. at 307.

149. Id.
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authority to the contrary. Bozza v. United StatesS ° is frequently
cited, albeit erroneously, as a conflicting precedent. The defendant in
Bozza was convicted of violating certain Internal Revenue laws
which carried a minimum statutory penalty of imprisonment and a
fine of one hundred dollars, but was sentenced to imprisonment only.
After realizing the omission, the judge had the defendant returned to
the court five hours later and imposed the mandatory minimum
sentence. Invoking Benz, the defendant contended that the increased
punishment placed him twice in jeopardy. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument as inimical to the legitimate goal of
punishing the guilty but did so in terms that intimated no
dissatisfaction with the rationales of either Lange or Benz. The
Court concluded that the original sentence, defective because of an
inadvertent error by the trial court, was invalid and unenforceable,
and it expressed a reluctance to grant immunity to a prisoner whose
guilt was established by a regular verdict in such circumstances. 15 1
The Bozza Court thus held that the defendant was not twice placed
in jeopardy for the same offense by the substitution of a valid
punishment for an invalid punishment, despite its increased
severity, and its decision stands only for the proposition that the
correction of an illegal or invalid sentence does not violate double
152
jeopardy even if the correction augments the punishment.
There is no indication in Bozza that the Court intended to
abandon the principles of Lange, Murphy, and Benz. In fact,, tacit
acceptance of those principles may have been responsible for the
particular care with which the Court created the Bozza exception.
Assuming the familiar role of accommodating competing interests,
the Bozza Court concluded that "[t]he Constitution does not require
that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the
judge means immunity for the prisoner."1 53 On the facts before the
Court, the legitimate sentencing goals of the government outweighed
any interest of the defendant in freedom from punishment due to an
error in sentencing. Once a valid and enforceable sentence has been
imposed, however, the government's interests have been vindicated,
and they must then yield to the defendant's interests in finality and

150. 330 U.S. 160 (1947).

151. Id. at 166.
152. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time
and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided
herein for the reduction of sentence.").
153. 330 U.S. at 166-67.
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freedom from multiple punishments as protected by the double
jeopardy clause.

5 4

Because S. 1437 proposes the first comprehensive federal system
of appellate sentence review, and no state, has as yet passed laws
authorizing prosecutorial appeal of sentences, 155 there is no case law
that addresses the constitutionality of this concept directly.
Nevertheless, the federal courts of appeals' interpretations of the
crucial Supreme Court precedents in this area offer further support
for the broad interpretation of Lange and Benz and for the
application of traditional double jeopardy principles in the sentencing context.
First, the courts of appeals agree that for the purposes of double
jeopardy analysis, there is a fundamental distinction between
appeals initiated by the defendant and those initiated by the
154. Note, Twice in Jeopardy: ProsecutorialAppeals of Sentences, 63 VA. L. REv.
325, 336 (1977). Bozza is also significant in another respect. To a large extent,
arguments against prosecutorial appeal of sentences derive their support from
traditional double jeopardy principles which are commonly applied in the areas of
conviction or acquittal, but have not been specifically applied to the sentencing
context. Arguably, Bozza indicates that these two contexts are not completely
analogous in that the decision permits subsequent proceedings following a final,
albeit an illegal, judgment. Therefore, it is likely that the Court does not favor the
unrestricted application of traditional double jeopardy principles in a sentencing
context. It is more plausible, however, to view the Bozza holding as entirely consistent
with traditional concepts. First, it is analogous to the situation in which the acquittal
of a defendant by a court with no jurisdiction permits subsequent retrial. Second, if
the correction of the illegal sentence is mechanical, Bozza is analogous to Wilson
which allows appeal by the government if the subsequent proceedings would merely
involve the reinstatement of a guilty verdict. See text accompanying notes 94 to 96
supra.
155. Many states have enacted some form of sentence review legislation.
Generally, these statutes allow the defendant to seek review of an excessive sentence,
and in some instances, the state is permitted to appeal from an illegal sentence. No
state statute presently authorizes the government to appeal and to augment a valid
original sentence. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-4037 (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE
1259 to 1260 (West Compact ed. 1978); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1.409 (1973); CONN.
GEN: STAT. ANN. §§ 51-195 to -196 (West. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 924.06 to .07
(West 1972 & Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. §27-2511.1 (1978); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§641-11 to -13 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-A, § 615(b) (Smith-Hurd 1976); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 814.5 to .6 (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3602, -3605 (Supp.
1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 2142 to 2144 (Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§§ 645JA to 645JG (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, §§ 28A to 28C (West 1972);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 95-2501 to -2504 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2308 (1975);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§450.10 to .30 (McKinney 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§1066 (1958); OR. REV.'STAT. §138.050 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §40-2711 (1975);
Wyo. R. CRIM. PROC. 33, 36, 38.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(a) (Supp. 1972) permits the defendant to appeal an
excessive sentence and subsection (b) allows the state to appeal a lenient sentence.
The reviewing court may not increase sentences on a state-initiated appeal; it is only
empowered to express its approval or disapproval of the sentence.
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15 7
government.1 5 6 Two court of appeals cases, Walsh v. Picard
and
5 8
Robinson v. Warden,' are illustrative. Both cases arose when the
defendants challenged, upon writs of habeas corpus, the constitutionality of state sentence review acts which permitted the reviewing
panel to increase prisoners' sentences if they appealed. The statutes
conferred the right to sentence review on the defendant alone; the
state was not authorized to seek review. 159 The issue raised by these
cases increased punishment upon review initiated by the
defendant - is reminiscent of the traditional notions of waiver
enunciated in Murphy and elaborated in Pearce.1 6° The Walsh court
acknowledged the conclusion in Pearce that the double jeopardy
clause did not afford absolute immunity in all circumstances and
held that an increase in sentence under the Massachusetts act at
issue was constitutionally permissible.1 61 Finding no bar to increases
in sentences upon review sought by the defendant, the Walsh court
emphasized the purposes underlying sentence review - the promotion of more accurate and uniform sentencing as well as the
reduction of unfair sentencing disparities. Referring to Benz, the
court stated that "the Massachusetts procedure does not permit the
State to reopen the question of sentence on its own initiative. Were it
to do so, it would of course violate the proscription against double
jeopardy."1 62 Walsh thus clearly interpreted Benz as precluding any
sentence review at the behest of the government, 63 thereby
upholding the traditional distinction between government and
individual initiative which is fundamental in double jeopardy
analysis.
The Robinson court held that Pearce foreclosed the defendant's
double jeopardy claim.1 64 Relying solely on that decision, the court
concluded that petition under the Maryland act "fully reopens the
propriety of the sentence at the behest of the defendant who seeks

156. See, e.g., Tipton v. Baker, 432 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970).
157. 446 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. (1972).
158. 455 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1972).
159. The statute at issue in Robinson was MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 132 to 138
(1966) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645JA to 645JG (1976 & Cum.
Supp. 1978)). The statute involved in Walsh was MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278,
§§ 28A to 28D (West 1968) (current version at (West 1972)).
160. See text accompanying notes 113 to 116 and 142 to 145 supra.
161. 446 F.2d at 1211.
162. Id.
163. In reaffirming the notion that the state cannot initiate review, the court
explained: "[W]e find it constitutionally permissible to condition the grant of a
defendant's appeal of the appropriateness of his sentence on the state's having a right
to cross-appeal on the same matter." Id. at 1212.
164. 455 F.2d at 1174.
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review. When a prisoner initiates review, the state has an interest in
assuring that punishment for similar criminal conduct is uniformly
imposed." 165 The court found unpersuasive the defendant's reliance
upon Lange and Benz for the proposition that increases in sentences
were barred. It noted that the increase in Robinson's sentence
differed from the situation in Lange where the original sentence had
been fully served. 166 The court invoked the traditional notion that
double jeopardy principles permit a different result when review is
initiated by the accused rather than by the government. 167 Distinguishing Lange on these grounds, the court concluded that the Benz
dictum,' 68 which relied upon Lange, had to be limited to the facts of
that case: "We find no suggestion that by dictum the Benz Court
intended to broaden Ex parte Lange's interpretation of the double
jeopardy clause.116 9 The court's view that Lange can be satisfactorily distinguished on the basis of the serving of the original sentence
may be unduly restrictive in light of the factual context of the Benz
decision. In Benz the defendant sought modification of his sentence
while serving that sentence. Moreover, the passage quoted above
follows the Robinson court's second point that distinct double
jeopardy implications arise as a result of actions by the defendant
rather than the prosecution, and might be related to that point alone.
If this is the case, it is clear that the Benz dictum was not intended
to cite Lange as rejecting the traditional principles governing the
consequences of action taken by the defendant. At most, Robinson
can be said only to reject the contention that Benz bars increased
sentences upon review sought by the defendant. Thus, Robinson
may be more accurately viewed as not having addressed the issue of
prosecutorial appeal of sentences, as Walsh had done. 70 The
significance of the Walsh and Robinson opinions is the extent to
which the courts recognized and addressed the double jeopardy issue
in terms of the distinction between individual and governmental
action. 17' It is this critical distinction that forms the basis of most

165. Id.
166. 455 F.2d at 1176.
167. Id. at 1174.
168. See text accompanying note 149 supra.
169. 455 F.2d at 1176.
170. The Fourth Circuit indicated in United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir.
1965), that a sentence was "not alterable by the prosecution save to reduce or correct it
as illegal under Rule 35 F.R. Crim. P., for the Government could not appeal or by any
other process augment it. . . . Its integrity was unimpeachable except by the
defendant." Id. at 430. See also Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1964).
171. E.g., Tipton v. Baker, 432 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970). In Tipton the defendant's
post-conviction attack on the judgment and sentence resulted in a remand for
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double jeopardy analysis by the Supreme Court. While it is not
certain that the power to seek appellate review of sentences under S.
1437 will ultimately turn on the individual versus government
distinction, the lower courts tend to invoke this rationale in
evaluating the constitutionality of analogous state sentencing
review acts.
Second, the courts of appeals have consistently interpreted
Lange and Benz as supporting the proposition that a sentence partly
suffered cannot be increased because such an increase would subject
the defendant to double punishment for the same offense in violation
of the fifth amendment.172 In Chandler v. United States,1 7 :1 for
example, the trial court was requested by the defendant to reduce an
excessive sentence which had been imposed erroneously when the
court transposed count numbers. On the defendant's motion, the
court reduced the excessive sentence on one count but also increased
the unchallenged sentence on the other count. The court of appeals
found that the double jeopardy clause "is not limited to the retrial of
the question of guilt, but also protects against resentencing for the
same offense," 174 explaining that a sentence greater than that
originally imposed is permissible only when the defendant has
sought modification, thereby assuming the risk of increase. Other
cases have reached this conclusion in similar circumstances, 75

resentencing only. The defendant then challenged the subsequent increase in
sentence. Relying on Murphy, see text accompanying notes 142 to 145 supra,the court
found the prohibition against multiple punishment inapplicable because "[h]ere there
is no such barrier to an increased sentence, because the prior sentence had been set
aside, at the defendant's behest." 432 F.2d at 248 n.5. Articulating a concept often
repeated in double jeopardy adjudication, the court concluded: "While it is not free
from doubt, we nevertheless believe that the prohibition against a sentence being
augmented does not apply where invalidation of the prior sentence occurred at the
defendant's behest." Id. at 249. Cf. King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291, 295 (D.C. Cir.
1938) (applied in habeas corpus context). But cf. United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486,
488 (8th Cir. 1976) (sentence limited to original length where defendant requested postconviction sentence review).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1977); Virgin Islands v.
Henry, 533 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Turner, 518 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1975);
Barnes v. United States, 419 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Sacco, 367 F.2d
368 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965). It must be borne in mind that the great
majority of these cases do not arise in the context of sentence review procedures, but
in the analogous situation when the sentencing court is requested to modify its
sentence.
173. 468 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1972).
174. Id. at 835.
175. See, e.g., Sullens v. United States, 409 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir.
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indicating the courts' adoption of a broad, rather than restrictive,
interpretation of Lange and Benz.
Third, there is agreement among the circuits on the current
vitality of the Bozza doctrine. 176 It is well settled that the double
jeopardy protection prohibiting the increase of sentence once
execution has begun applies only to cases in which the first sentence
is valid.

177

To summarize, the federal court of appeals' decisions are notable
in three respects. First, the courts recognize, and frequently
emphasize, that a prior sentence invalidated at the insistence of the
accused cannot be asserted as precluding a subsequent increase in
that punishment. 1 78 Second, the circuits interpret Lange and Benz to
mean that the double jeopardy clause stands as a bar to any increase
in a valid sentence once the defendant has commenced service.
Finally, the decisions agree, as they must in light of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35,179 with the Bozza doctrine which permits
correction of an illegal sentence at any time.

1966). Cf. Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
988 (1965) (sentence can be increased when defendant has not yet begun to serve and
resentencing occurs on same day).
176. See text accompanying notes 150 to 152 supra.
177. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Parratt, 554 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Stevens, 548 F2d 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977); Llerna v. United
States, 508 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Evans, 459 F.2d 1134 (D.C. Cir.
1972). The Evans court observed: "It is well settled that a sentence in all respects legal
cannot be increased after the defendant has begun serving it ....
A sentence plainly
illegal, however, (e.g., less than the statutory minimum) may be corrected even after
the defendant has begun serving it." Id. at 1136 (citations omitted). See FED. R. CRIM.
P. 35 and note 152 supra.
178. One federal district court analyzed this concept as follows:
Not every increase in sentence or punishment is a violation of the
constitutional ban on double jeopardy. Thus where a convicted prisoner
demands a trial de nova . . . , or requests a review of his sentence by a
sentence review board ....
or successfully appeals and obtains a new trial

... ,it has been held that harsher sentences can be imposed. The rationale of
such cases is that the re-trial or reconsideration of the sentence was the
prisoner's own idea and was done at his instigation; he has called for and
received a new hand and can't complain if in the new deal he drew a busted
straight instead of a flush.
On the other hand, where the harsher sentence was not the result of any
move or initiative by the prisoner, or the exercise of any option by him, but
was, instead, imposed upon him without any choice on his part at any stage
of the proceeding, such harsher sentence is unconstitutional.
Holt v. Moore, 357 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (citations omitted).
179. See note 152 supra.
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN THE SENTENCING CONTEXT

While the policies underlying the double jeopardy clause are
revealed in the federal case law regarding multiple proceedings on
the issue of guilt or innocence, the crucial question remains: Are
these policies applicable to the sentencing context? At first glance,
the answer appears evident. It is well settled that the double
jeopardy clause affords protection against multiple punishment and
not merely against multiple prosecutions. 8 0 Furthermore, the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is virtually
meaningless if it only prevents successive trials and not repeated
attempts to punish. Bozzas'' and Pearce,8 2 however, suggest that
the Court may be reluctant to apply traditional double jeopardy
principles in the sentencing context without qualification. In Bozza,
the Court stated that the correction of an illegal sentence was not
violative of the double jeopardy clause even though that correction
resulted in an increased sentence. This opinion may be characterized
as an exception to the prohibition against increased sentences set
out in Lange and Benz.18 3 Arguably, Bozza limits Benz. Acknowledging that Benz represents an extension of accepted double jeopardy
principles to sentencing, the Court in Bozza may nevertheless have
balked at the suggestion that an inadvertent error should immunize
a convicted defendant from a valid and enforceable sentence. Bozza
is perhaps best viewed as a retreat from the Benz dictum that
punishment cannot be augmented insofar as its opinion reflects the
Court's reluctance to embrace wholeheartedly in the sentencing
context double jeopardy concepts evolving under different circumstances.
It may be argued that Pearce is also a recent example of this
reluctance and that the two cases foreshadow the Court's ultimate
departure from established doctrine in the sentencing context. Prior
to Pearce, the Court had held in Green that the double jeopardy
clause prevented conviction on retrial of the greater offense when the
defendant was originally convicted of only the lesser included
offense. 8 4 In Pearce, it seemed appropriate to extend the "implied
acquittal" of the defendant on the greater charge rationale, the
theoretical basis for the Court's conclusion in Green, to sentenc-
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ing; 8 5 but the Pearce Court nevertheless found no double jeopardy
bar to increased punishment upon reconviction. Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting in part in Pearce, forcefully expressed the view that "the
concept or fiction of an 'implicit acquittal' of the greater offense...
applies equally to the greater sentence" 186 and that enhanced
punishment on retrial is therefore precluded once the degree of
severity has been specified. Labeling the majority's conclusion on
the double jeopardy issue "incongruous," he added:
If, as a matter of policy and practicality, the imposition of an
increased sentence on retrial has the same consequences
whether effected in the guise of an increase in the degree of
offense or an augmentation of punishment, what other factors
render one route forbidden and the other permissible under the
Double Jeopardy Clause?1 8 7
Mr. Justice Harlan found no rational distinction for the disparate
treatment of the prosecution and sentence situations under the
double jeopardy clause. Although the Pearce Court distinguished
Green on the ground that it dealt with retrial after acquittal, its
decision may presage the Court's refusal to apply traditional double
jeopardy principles to the sentencing context without significant
modification.
While the Court's decisions in Pearce and Bozza suggest the
Court's reluctance to accord a convicted defendant the same
protection under the double jeopardy clause as an accused defendant, the ultimate direction of the Court remains uncertain. In the
overwhelming majority of cases, the Court has acknowledged, at
least implicitly, that the constitutional safeguard against multiple
punishment is subject to the same double jeopardy principles that
have traditionally protected defendants against multiple prosecutions. In several cases, the Court has regarded the avoidance of
multiple punishments as the central purpose of the fifth amendment
proscription. 8 8 It is inconsistent with the history and purposes of

185. In his dissent in Green, Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed:
As a practical matter, and on any basis of human values, it is scarcely
possible to distinguish a case in which the defendant is convicted of a greater
offense from one in which he is convicted of an offense that has the same
name as that of which he was previously convicted but carries a significantly
[increased] punishment.
355 U.S. 184, 213 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
186. 395 U.S. 711, 746 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
187. Id. at 746-47.
188. See text accompanying notes 106 to 111 supra.
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the double jeopardy clause to accord a lesser degree of protection in a
sentencing context, where the threat of punishment is most acute.
Conceptually, it is difficult to segregate the protections provided
by the double jeopardy clause into discrete categories. Although the
PearceCourt recognized three different aspects of this guarantee, the
concepts overlap. For example, in Breed v. Jones18 9 Mr. Chief Justice
Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court, explained: "Jeopardy
denotes risk. In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk
that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution.' 19°
Holding that the protection against double jeopardy was applicable
to juvenile proceedings, the Court emphasized the potential deprivation of liberty which attaches to juvenile delinquency proceedings
and found them tantamount to criminal prosecutions. The Breed
Court recognized and relied upon the fact that a criminal prosecution
encompasses more than just the determination of innocence or guilt:
[T]he risk to which the term jeopardy refers is that traditionally
associated with "actions intended to authorize criminal punishment to vindicate public justice."

. .

. Because of its purpose and

potential consequences, and the nature and resources of the
State, such a proceeding imposes heavy pressures and burdens
-

psychological, physical and financial - on a person charged.

The purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to require that he
be subject to the experience only once "for the same offense." 1 91
Although Bozza and Pearce suggest that the Court may have
different standards depending upon the nature of the case invoking
the guarantee, against double jeopardy, there is no persuasive
evidence that the Court considers traditional double jeopardy
principles inapplicable to the sentencing context.
Even if double jeopardy principles are fully applicable, it is
necessary to define the governmental interests served by the system
of appellate review of sentences advocated in S. 1437. The sentencing
provisions of S. 1437, of which the sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Commission and the system of appellate review are a
part,1 92 represent a thorough reform of current federal criminal
practice. The guidelines are intended to limit the trial judge's
discretion while retaining a certain degree of flexibility to accommodate the peculiarities of individual cases. 193 Appellate review of
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

421 U.S. 519 (1975).
Id. at 528.
Id. at 529-30 (citation omitted).
See text accompanying notes 7 to 19 supra.
See S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1056 (1977).
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sentences is designed to complement these guidelines by eliminating
egregious sentence disparities and promoting rationality and
fairness in sentencing decisions. Appellate review is also intended to
provide a mechanism by which the sentencing guidelines may be
gradually refined and to foster the development of sentencing
policies and principles through case adjudication. 194 The provision
that permits the government to seek increased sentences on appeal is
a necessary part of this process, one which parallels the defendant's
right to appeal an arguably excessive punishment. According to the
Senate report, one important consideration was to provide an
"effective opportunity for the reviewing courts to correct the injustice
arising from a sentence that was patently too lenient."'1 95 The Senate
Judiciary Committee observed that
[tihe unequal availability of appellate review... would have a
tendency to skew the system, since if appellate review were a
one-way street, so that the tribunal could only reduce excessive
sentences but not enhance inadequate ones, then the effort to
achieve greater uniformity might well result in a gradual scaling
196
down of sentences to the level of the most lenient ones.
While these are plausible policy reasons for permitting the government to seek an increase in the prisoner's sentence through appellate
review, the constitutional policies embodied in the double jeopardy
clause require that the accused's interest in the finality of criminal
proceedings and freedom from repeated efforts by the government to
increase the sentence only be subordinated to a more substantial and
compelling governmental interest. Although the aims of S. 1437's
appellate review system are understandable, it must also be
understood that these governmental interests clash with the
criminal defendant's constitutional right to be free from double
jeopardy. Furthermore, the government's interest in promoting
prosecutorial appeal of sentences is substantially less persuasive
than it is in other procedural contexts such as mistrials or the
imposition of illegal sentences. The argument that the double
jeopardy clause will immunize the guilty from prosecution is not
appropriate here; punishment has been, and will be, imposed to some
extent, albeit not to the government's satisfaction. Neither is
society's interest in punishing the guilty denied by extending double
jeopardy principles to the sentencing context. On the contrary, it is

194. Id. at 1056-57.
195. Id. at 1057.
196. Id.
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vindicated insofar as the defendant is sentenced to a valid punishment.
CONCLUSION

While balancing the defendant's and the government's interests
is a subjective and unpredictable process, the synthesis of the case
law from analogous contexts supports the conclusion that prosecutorial appeal of sentences is unconstitutional. The interests of the
accused protected by the double jeopardy clause are not so
insubstantial that they may be subordinated to just any governmental interest. The interest must be vital to the orderly administration
of the criminal justice system. To the extent that the double jeopardy
clause interferes with the fulfillment of governmental objectives in
the sentencing context, it is the price the Constitution requires the
government to bear.
A related consideration is the vital safeguard against abuses of
governmental power provided by this fifth amendment guarantee.
The central theme of double jeopardy case law is the fundamental
distinction between individual and state action. While additional
proceedings initiated by the defendant are ordinarily not prohibited
by the double jeopardy clause, the Court has only reluctantly
permitted governmental appeals and then only in extremely narrow
circumstances in which society's need to protect itself from those
guilty of criminal conduct is compelling. S. 1437 affords the
government a "second bite at the apple" - it permits the prosecution
to seek what it considers to be a satisfactory sentence by subjecting
individuals to successive proceedings, and it is precisely this abuse
of power that the double jeopardy clause is designed to forbid.
The foregoing analysis suggests that S. 1437's appellate
sentence review system may be constitutionally unsound. Although
the Supreme Court, in analyzing double jeopardy issues, balances
the countervailing interests of the individual and the government,
traditional principles of double jeopardy dictate that the balance
should ultimately be struck to protect the individual from the further
proceedings authorized by S. 1437 once a final verdict has been
rendered. It is apparent that the Supreme Court has recognized, at
least tacitly, the viability of extending this balancing approach to
the imposition of sentences. To disclaim its relevance is to eviscerate
the protection against double jeopardy afforded by the fifth amendment.

